Abstract. The past decade has witnessed the emergence of a novel stance on semantic representation, and its relationship to context sensitivity. Connectionist-minded philosophers, including Clark and van Gelder, have espoused the merits of viewing hidden-layer, context-sensitive representations as possessing semantic content, where this content is partially revealed via the representations' position in vector space. In recent work, Bodén and Niklasson have incorporated a variant of this view of semantics within their conception of semantic systematicity. Moreover, Bodén and Niklasson contend that they have produced experimental results which not only satisfy a kind of context-based, semantic systematicity, but which, to the degree that reality permits, effectively deals with challenges posed by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) , and Hadley (1994a). The latter challenge involved well-defined criteria for strong semantic systematicity. This paper examines the relevant claims and experiments of Bodén and Niklasson. It is argued that their case fatally involves two fallacies of equivocation; one concerning 'semantic content' and the other concerning 'novel test sentences'. In addition, it is argued that their ultimate construal of context sensitive semantics contains serious confusions. These confusions are also found in certain publications dealing with "latent semantic analysis". Thus, criticisms presented here have relevance beyond the work of Bodén and Niklasson.
Introduction

1
The influence of Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) critique of the cognitive import of connectionist networks can scarcely be overstated. Its publication not only prompted a flurry of connectionist experiments intended to refute Fodor and Pylyshyn, but has substantially influenced entire books (e.g. Horgan and Tienson, 1996; Marcus, 2001) dealing with the combinatorial potential of connectionist networks. To be sure, Fodor and Pylyshyn (hereafter, F&P) concede the possibility that connectionist methods might provide key insights into how classical models of cognition could be implemented within a neural substrate. However, they deny that more radical (or non-implementational) approaches to connectionist modeling could ever provide a viable explanation of the combinatorial aspects of human thought and language use. One such aspect, identified by F&P as systematicity, consists in the (argued) fact that human thought and language comprehension are manifestations of a coherent, underlying system; our ability to entertain certain thoughts (and to understand certain sentences) is caused by the very mechanisms that ensure our ability to think (or understand) systematically related variants of the original thoughts and sentences. Thus, humans who can understand sentences of the form x Relation y (e.g. John loves Mary) can also, as a matter of causal necessity, understand sentences of the form y Relation x (Mary loves John).
At the heart of F&P's critique of radical (non-implementational) connectionism resides their contention that the systematicity of thought and language comprehension could only be engendered within systems that employ representations possessing classical constituent structure, where such structure is manipulated by structure sensitive processes (see Hadley and Hayward (1997) for a detailed discussion of these aspects). In a small nutshell, mental representations display classical constituent structure exactly when it is impossible to activate a 'token' (or instance) of a complex representation without simultaneously activating its (syntactic) constituent 'parts'. Structure sensitive processes are processes which operate on representations, of the above kind, by virtue of their form (or their constituent structure). Now, as detailed in Hadley (2002) , the differing connectionist 'counter-examples' to F&P have met with varying degrees of success. Notably, those connectionist models which clearly have attained the highest degree of success possess an innate bias towards combinatorial processing. This innate bias is manifested either in the fundamentally classical nature of the representations employed (i.e. in the constituent structure) or in the classical (combinatorial) nature of the hand-crafted wiring employed, or both. Any connectionist model which clearly eschewed both classically-based representations and combinatorially biased wiring, while still manifesting a high degree of systematicity, would be particularly noteworthy and important. In the present paper, I examine claims made for one such (apparent) model, a model due to Bodén and Niklasson (2000) . To understand these claims, we must first review two learning-based variants on F&P's conception of systematicity, since these variants were more directly the targets of Bodén and Niklasson's research than F&P's original conception of systematicity. (Indeed, in a 1994 paper, Niklasson, with his co-author Tim van Gelder, argued that F&P's conception of systematicity is unacceptably vague.) The two variants in question concern strong systematicity and strong semantic systematicity.
The expressions 'Strong Systematicity' (SS) and 'Strong Semantic Systematicity' (SSS) were introduced and formally defined in Hadley (1994a) and Hadley (1994b) , respectively. These definitions were intended not only to clarify the nature of attempts (recent at that time) to satisfy F&P's (1988) well known systematicity challenge, but to highlight the remaining distance between what those attempts had accomplished and what F&P were demanding. Detailed explanations of SS and SSS are provided in Section 2, but for the moment the following (oversimplified) characterizations should suffice. A connectionist network (or human agent) exhibits SS provided it 'learns to generalize a significant fraction of its vocabulary to novel syntactic positions' within both simple and complex sentences' (Hadley et al., 2001) . In contrast, an agent or network satisfies SSS provided it not only exhibits SS, but can assign correct meaning representations to any of the novel test sentences which could be used to establish the presence of SS in that agent. Now, Niklasson and van Gelder (1994) presented connectionist experiments which, in their view, satisfied at least the conditions required by SS. My reply (1994b) to their article described their results as a 'borderline case' of SS, and I pointed out several difficulties with their work which diminished my agreement with their claims. Among other things, these difficulties included: (a) only a single novel term was ever employed, and (b) the encoding of this novel term had been carefully crafted to ensure that its eventual vector representation would fall exactly in the centre of the vector space that kindred, non-novel terms occupied. These two defects (as I viewed them) contributed very substantially to the network's 'success' at generalization.
In recent work, Bodén and Niklasson (2000) present experiments and arguments designed to show that connectionist networks can not only satisfy SS, but also a kind of strong semantic systematicity, at least when the concept of 'semantic representation' is construed in a fashion which they believe is fair to connectionism. Indeed, they forthrightly claim that 'In the experimental section we shall show how the proposed architecture is an extension of the work of Niklasson and van Gelder, intended to remove Hadley's reservation' (p. 129) . They also state that '... we contend that the connectionist metaphor is not only leveling with Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) challenge but also with Hadley's (1994a, b) revised challenge of semantic systematicity' (p. 139) and further, 'The connectionist system we present in the following will be able to assign relevant semantic content to novel tokens appearing in test sentences which could demonstrate strong systematicity' (Bodén and Niklasson, 2000, p. 113) . Unfortunately, Bodén and Niklasson (henceforth, B&N) fail to notify their readers that neither SS nor SSS is concerned with novel tokens, but rather with known words that appear in novel positions. This, however, is not their largest problem.
In what follows, I will argue that B&N have not produced, in their present work (2000) , any convincing example of a network's displaying SS, much less a kind of SSS. As they acknowledge, only one of their experiments is even intended to avoid my 1994 criticism. I contend that this one crucial experiment is fatally flawed, because B&N fail to show that their network ever successfully processes a 'novel test sentence'. Rather, B&N fall prey to the fallacy of equivocation and employ the expression 'novel test sentence' in an unusual, and implausible fashion. Moreover, I argue that they effectively equivocate on the meaning of 'semantics', because in actual practice they adopt mistakenly lax standards for what constitutes a correct semantic representation. Significantly, my examination of this latter equivocation has relevance beyond B&N's work. For, as will be explained in the final discussion, B&N's remarks on semantics echo similar comments and confusions found in influential publications dealing with latent semantic analysis (see, for example, Landaurer and Dumais, 1997; Wiemer-Hastings and Zipitria, 2001) .
Before delving into more complex issues, I should acknowledge that, in my view, there does exist a connectionist network which successfully satisfies the conditions of SSS. This network, first presented in Hadley and Hayward (1997) , employs only self-organizing forms of learning. However, the semantic representations it employs, though they possess certain non-classical features, arguably do satisfy Fodor's and Pylyshyn's (1988) conception of classical constituent structure.
Learning-Based Definitions of Systematicity
As noted earlier, F&P's (1988) paper prompted not a few connectionists to explore the combinatorial properties of backpropagation networks. By 1990, it had been established that both simple recurrent networks (SRNs) and Recursive AutoAssociative Memories (RAAMs) could successfully process sentences in which novel combinations of words were present. However, it remained unclear whether such networks could be trained to accommodate novel orderings of constituents. Indeed, to all appearances, an important form of systematic generalization remained untested. This fact was noted in Hadley (1992 Hadley ( , 1994a where a hierarchy of degrees of learning-based systematicity was first introduced.
For purposes of the discussion which follows, it will be helpful to have in mind a brief paraphrase of a portion of this hierarchy. (A somewhat similar, though less hierarchical, set of distinctions can be found in Niklasson & van Gelder, 1994.) A cognitive agent, or a connectionist network, might exhibit any of the following degrees of systematicity. (In the following, 'novel' is measured relative to a known training corpus. Also, the phrase, 'test sentence', following common usage among connectionists, refers to a sentence which the network has not been trained upon. Moreover, in points (1) and (2) below, allusions to an agent's ability to process sentences has been left partially vague, because the connectionist networks discussed in Hadley (1994a) adopted widely differing approaches to processing sentences.)
1. Weak Systematicity. An agent is at most weakly systematic if, after training, it can process 'test' sentences (or symbol sequences) containing novel combinations of words (symbols), but cannot process sentences containing familiar words in positions which are novel to those words. 2. An agent is strongly systematic (SS) if and only if 'it can correctly process a variety of novel simple sentences and novel embedded sentences containing previously learned words in positions where they do not appear in the training corpus (i.e., the word within the novel sentence does not appear in that same syntactic position within any simple or embedded sentence in the training corpus). Recall that a word can occupy the same syntactic position (e.g. subject) in both a simple and an embedded sentence. In such cases (where strong systematicity is concerned), neither the simple nor the embedded sentence counts as novel with respect to the other, unless other known words are being used in genuinely novel positions in those sentences. The forms of systematicity just listed do not require that an agent be capable of semantically interpreting the sentences in question. However, F&P's examples of systematicity included cases where an agent assigns meaning to the sentences involved (e.g. whoever understands 'John loves Mary' can also understand 'Mary loves John'). Any learning-based conception of systematicity which approaches the depth of F&P's initial challenge must therefore include the ability to assign correct semantic interpretations. For this reason, a more demanding criterion (given below) of systematicity was offered in Hadley (1994b) .
3. Strong Semantic Systematicity (SSS) 'A system possesses semantic systematicity if it is strongly systematic and it assigns appropriate meanings to all words occurring in novel test sentences which (would or could) demonstrate the strong systematicity of the network' (Hadley, 1994b) . Now, it must be noted that B&N do not claim to satisfy the precise details of my definition of SSS. At one point they say,
The results presented herein do not achieve exactly what semantic systematicity requires. Instead, we have shown that by redefining some central concepts in folk psychology in terms of connectionist primitives a similar kind of context-based systematicity can be achieved. In the following, we shall still use Hadley's levels (weak, quasi and strong) of systematicity to qualify what has been achieved. Nevertheless, in the passages quoted earlier, especially when they say 'The connectionist system we present in the following will be able to assign relevant semantic content to novel tokens appearing in test sentences which could demonstrate strong systematicity', they strongly imply that they have very nearly satisfied the requirements for SSS, their caveat being that they employ a conception of 'semantic content' which they believe to be most suitable to connectionist research. Moreover, B&N state, in effect, that they will and have produced an experimental result which lays to rest my published 1994 qualms about Niklasson's and van Gelder's 1994 work. For these reasons, I wish to emphasize certain crucial aspects of my definitions of SS and SSS. In particular, both SS and SSS require (i) that previously known words be used in novel positions within (post-training) test sentences; (ii) a significant fraction of the vocabulary of the training corpus must be presented in these novel positions; (iii) the 'novel positions' in question must appear in both simple sentences and embedded clauses.
Of all experiments described in their paper (2000) not one satisfies points (i) and (ii) above. In addition, as will emerge, their crucial (coup de grace) experiment entirely ignores condition (iii) (i.e. all three of the sentences involved in that experiment are extremely simple, such as 'ernie flies'). In light of these points alone, the passages I have quoted from B&N seem at least misleading.
In Section 4, we shall consider the view of 'semantic content' that B&N put forward, as they set the stage for the experiment they believe to have attained a kind of SSS. Before examining details of their view, however, I would ask the reader to note that nothing in my definition of SSS assumes a classically based semantic theory. My definition only requires that the agent 'assigns appropriate meanings to all words occurring in novel test sentences which (would or could) demonstrate the strong systematicity of the network'. I have left it an open question how appropriate meanings are represented.
It is important to bear in mind, however, that both my definition of SSS and Fodor and Pylyshyn's original characterization of systematicity were introduced in the context of several examples of sentences found in natural language. Both in the case of Fodor and Pylyshyn and myself, the terms 'semantics' and 'meaning' were used as they are commonly understood by philosophers and linguists. In particular, the semantics (or meaning) of a declarative sentence in natural language was assumed to be intrinsically connected to the ability of such a sentence to describe or express situations (or states of affairs) which could render a given sentence true. It is by virtue of knowing the semantics (or understanding the meaning) of a sentence that we can often form at least some conception of what state of affairs could warrant an ascription of truth to a sentence. (For more on this, see Hadley, 1989.) Since this is so, within the definition of SSS, the phrase 'assign appropriate meanings to all words occurring in novel test sentences ...' must be understood against a background of standards of correctness. Any purported demonstration that SSS has been attained (or even nearly attained) by a network must present convincing evidence that the 'novel test sentence' has been assigned a semantic representation that is semantically coherent and correct. Here I use the words 'coherent' and 'correct' in their ordinary, usual senses, as elaborated below.
We have all, at times, encountered phrases whose meanings are incoherent insofar as we (being competent users of the language) cannot make clear sense of them. For example, anyone who has marked the essays of a large class of first year college students will have encountered 'sentences' with incoherent meanings. A sentence's meaning can be incoherent because some words are missing, or because it contains words used inappropriately, or because the syntax is garbled. A somewhat similar situation exists with regard to 'correct'. One can incorrectly assign a meaning to (or interpret) a sentence which has one or more standard senses within a language. One need not have a theory of meaning to know that incorrect meaning assignments often occur. Most of us, at times, have misinterpreted phrases or sentences. This also frequently occurs when students are learning a new subject matter. Now, within the context of the systematicity debate, a crucial aspect of demonstrating that coherence and correctness have been attained is that one show that, once words in a novel test sentence have been assigned appropriate meanings, the resultant meaning representation for the entire sentence possesses properties which would enable us to justly claim that the entire representation could, in principle, constrain the set of situations which could render the sentence true. One cannot simply assume, for example, that any arbitrary activation pattern produced on a network's hidden layer possesses these properties. Such properties were demonstrably present in the semantic representations developed by the trained network exhibited in Hadley and Hayward (1997) . It is noteworthy also that a requirement that all words in a given 'test sentence' have a prior, known semantics greatly facilitates our judgment as to whether a trained network has in fact correctly assigned appropriate meanings to the words involved that test sentence.
The preceding paragraph may lead some readers to suppose that I am committed to the controversial thesis which holds that the meaning (or semantic content) of a sentence suffices to entirely fix or determine its referents in the actual world. In fact, I am committed to a substantially weaker thesis than this, namely, that the meaning of a sentence must at least place strong constraints on its possible referents in the realm that the sentence aims to describe. In order to clarify my commitments concerning semantics, and to enable a better understanding of the case against B&N, I now digress to present certain 'rock-bottom' assumptions about semantics.
Necessary Constraints on Acceptable Semantic Theory
The following are fundamental premises which, I believe, virtually all readers will accept upon brief reflection. These premises express necessary, but not sufficient conditions upon acceptable theories of semantics. If any reader doubts the 'basic truths' which are presented in this section, she/he is invited to skip to Section 5, which presents an independently motivated and sufficient objection to B&N. Please note that the following (italicized) premises, and indeed the remainder of this paper, are concerned only with the semantics of sentences which conceivably possess truth values. Such sentences describe possible situations, circumstances, or states of affairs. This assumption accords well with B&N's focus on the semantics of sentences used in reasoned arguments. (Henceforth I will use the term 'situation' to refer to situations, circumstances, and states of affair -construed non-technically The 'terms' in 'xirtmbv wbotmrk bkdw' might conceivably evoke arbitrary or random associations in some English speakers, but associations of this kind do not contribute to this sentence's having a standard meaning in English. The obvious fact is that the 'terms' in question do not possess associations of an appropriate kind within the minds of semantically competent English speakers. This fact in turn is causally related to (a) the fact that this sequence of symbols is meaningless in English, and (b) the fact that this string of symbols does not, in English, describe a possible situation in the world.
P5. If an agent is semantically competent in the use of a sentence S, and S is widely recognized by typical speakers of the language to be a true sentence that describes a commonplace, physical situation in the external world, then this agent must possess some appropriate associations between S (or words in S)
and some aspects or items in the represented world. These associations may be indirectly mediated by internal representations, such as concepts or thoughts, but if so, then at least some of these internal entities must in turn possess appropriate associations with aspects of the represented world. (For the skeptically or solipsitically minded, I will allow that the hallucinatory mental images of a 'brain in a vat', count as aspects of the represented world). Note that the above conditions are satisfied even when a sentence expresses a possible situation in the distant past. For example, an agent who (competently) understands 'Plato taught Aristotle' must understand that Plato was a person. Moreover, the agent will have at least some associations between an internal representation of a person (generically conceived) and creatures encountered in the external world. (Similarly for 'Aristotle'). Even with a sentence such as 'Unicorns do not exist', the agent will have at least indirect associations between 'unicorns' and mental images, perceptions, or beliefs concerning creatures that fall within the agent's experience. P6. Assume that sentence S plausibly describes a commonplace situation (or kind of situation) in the macro-level physical world which competent language users can routinely identify as a situation to which S is, prima facie, correctly ap-plicable. Suppose also that an agent, A, is semantically competent in his/her comprehension of S.
Then, A's set of associations with S must be sufficiently various and elaborate to ensure that S describes to A (or for A) the kind of situation(s) to which S is prima facie (at least) applicable in the represented world.
This means, in effect, that the totality of A's associations with S must be sufficiently elaborate to suitably constrain A's conception of situations that satisfy S to situations which, by and large, are plausibly described by S in the given natural language. In using expressions such as 'represent to himself/herself' and 'conception of situations' I am not endorsing any particular analysis of these phrases (e.g. one which arguably is biased towards folk psychology). However, we do not require such an analysis before recognizing certain obvious facts. For example, if we read in today's newspaper that (S1) 'A tornado has today demolished the White House in Washington D.C.', we all know perfectly well that we can form at least some conception of a situation which would, on the face of it, render S1 true. Moreover, we know from the preceding premise, P5, that our hypothetical 'agent A', being semantically competent, must have at least some (possibly indirect) associations between the given S and aspects of the represented world. In our own case, it is obvious that our ability to form some conception of a situation which would render S1 true involves elaborate associations between certain words in S1 and aspects of the physical world. Now, based on the preceding P4, P5 and P6, it should be clear that no connectionist experimenter could plausibly claim that a neural network had correctly assigned a meaning representation to a sentence of natural language merely on the grounds that this 'representation' possesses, within a trained network, an association with some arbitrarily selected output datum (such as the number '1'). A correctly assigned meaning representation must be a representation that possesses a variety of associations of a specialized kind within the network, or with external data.
Bodén and Niklasson's Treatment of 'Semantic Content'
B&N are much concerned that 'semantic content' be understood in a (theory-laden) fashion that, in their view, does justice to the underlying assumptions of nonclassically-oriented connectionism. For this reason, they stress the need to realize that semantics, properly understood, deals with context-sensitive, distributed representations. Nevertheless, their initial characterization of semantic content (which they clearly accept) is certainly compatible with the notion that the semantics of a sentence bears an important relationship to the kind of situations in the represented world which, prima facie, satisfy the truth conditions of the sentence. They say, for example, '... the focus in semantic systematicity is on the meaning or content of representational tokens (i.e. what they refer to in the represent world).' The view that semantic content is intimately related to the ability of tokens in a sentence to refer to items in a represented world harmonizes nicely with the fundamental premises presented in the preceding section. This is not to say that B&N believe that the meaning of tokens suffices, by itself, to determine the referents of those tokens. It does indicate, however, that B&N would accept the view that the meaning of tokens at least constrains their possible referents.
Thus far, I have no quarrel with B&N's view of semantic content. It is essential to realize, however, that the ability of tokens to refer to objects in a represented world places strong constraints on the degree of context sensitivity of the meaning of words in a sentence. The word 'rabbits' denotes exactly the same class of objects in each of the following sentences: 'Ferraris are faster than rabbits', 'Rabbits are faster than turtles'. As Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) correctly remind us, it is only because of this consistency in reference (and meaning) that the following conclusion logically follows from those two sentences: 'Ferraris are faster than turtles'. B&N effectively acknowledge this point, when they cite Clark (1993) (see their p. 116), but they never resolve (or even further discuss) the conflict between their emphasis on the context sensitivity of the meaning of tokens (such as 'rabbits') and the constraints just described. Perhaps this is not surprising, because the view of semantic content that they proceed to present largely abandons the essential idea that semantic content bears any relation to the ability of 'tokens' and sentences to refer to aspects of an externally represented world.
As it emerges, B&N's account of the semantic content of sentences involves two, or possibly three major claims. At least two of these claims concern what B&N believe to be important sources of semantic content for trained networks.
One source of semantic content, on B&N's account, is the contextual constraints imposed by the training set to which a network is exposed. They say, for example, 'The content of an object representation is grounded in the training set which supplies the context in which the object appears'. Now, it is unclear to me whether, in the above quote and similar passages, B&N take the 'training set' to include target output data, used in backpropagation, or whether the training set is simply the input corpus. The former possibility is inseparable from what I see as B&N's second major claim, and this will be discussed before long. For the present, I consider the latter possibility, viz., that the training set is just the input corpus. (This latter possibility is worth considering for its own sake, because it expresses a view that is sometimes espoused in publications dealing with latent semantic content (statistically-oriented views of semantics)).
On this construal, we have: CLAIM 1. A major source (or perhaps the source) of semantic content for words which we normally regard as referring to objects is the set of word-order (or 'token-order') constraints found in the input corpus. (N.B., many researchers would describe these as syntactic constraints.)
It is essential to realize (though B&N may not share this view) that contextual constraints of the kind just described could not be the only source, or a sufficient source, of semantic content for words or sentences. This follows from the following fact. It is possible (and indeed this sometimes occurs) to create training corpora on the basis of artificial grammars and vocabularies which have no prior semantic content whatsoever. The sentences within these corpora incorporate word-order (syntactic) constraints imposed by the artificial grammar in question, and these constraints may be quite elaborate. Nevertheless, the sentences within the corpora simply do not possess any descriptive (or referential, or semantic) relationship to a represented world or situation. Nor are they associated with internal concepts, images, prototypes, etc., which in turn possess sufficiently elaborate and appropriate associations (with a represented world) to constrain the set of situations which the sentences putatively represent. In these conditions, internal distributed activation patterns (which develop on hidden layers of a network trained on the corpus) cannot be representing the semantic content of such sentences, because the sentences are utterly meaningless. Like the nonsense string, 'xirtmbr wbotmrk bkdw', they describe nothing. It is crucial to note, moreover, that even if sentences in the input corpus are selected from a natural human language, and so presumably possess meaning, any network architecture and training regime that generates hidden layer (HL) activation patterns merely on the basis of the contextual constraints within the training corpus would be generating HL patterns of precisely the same kind as are generated for the utterly meaningless sentences described above. That is, the HL activation patterns in each case would merely comprise statistical information about co-occurrence patterns among symbol tokens. Information of this type cannot constitute semantic information, because this type of information is identical in structure both when the input corpus contains only meaningless sentences, and when it contains sentences known to have meaning. The HL patterns in both cases merely reflect the constraints imposed by word order.
Apart from the above reasoning, one should reflect on this: It is widely known among logicians and mathematicians that one direct consequence of Gödel's famous incompleteness theorems is that the internal structural constraints imposed on any set of sentences taken to be adequate for number theory (e.g. Peano's axioms) do not suffice to permit a standard semantic interpretation to be fixed for those sentences. There is not sufficient information in the contextual constraints alone to determine the standard semantic content. Indeed, it has been proven that, for a given axiom set of the kind in question, there exists non-standard models which are not even isomorphic to the standard model of arithmetic (see van Heijenoort, 1967, p. 354) . The existence of non-standard models for arithmetic was independently proven by Skolem, in 1933 (van Heijenoort, 1967 . Contrast these facts with the following remark of B&N: 'Context is supplied by the training set. In our particular case, no prior coding of representations biased the results, so any content found depends on this context' (2000, p. 136) (my emphasis). Now, to be sure, B&N claim that they are redefining certain terms. Of course, one may redefine the term 'semantics' so that any set of HL activation patterns is, by definition, semantic in nature. However, doing this would render any experi-ments or 'counter-examples' that are based on this 'new' conception of semantics irrelevant to anything resembling the original challenge of SSS. This 'new' conception of semantics does not require that words possess any associations with experience that would even loosely constrain the possible referents of those words in the represented world. On this new conception, mere statistical information about contextual syntactic constraints is treated as 'meaning'. Such a view is incompatible with the fundamental requirements stated in Section 3 (premises 1-6).
CLAIM 2. The preceding five paragraphs were predicated on the assumption that B&N identify the 'training set' with just the input corpus. However, in a number of places B&N indicate that semantic content is derived not only from the input set, but from the various associations that occur during the course of training. Activation patterns that develop in the hidden layer(s) often do, during training, become associated with data that is presented on an output layer (in cases where Hebbian learning takes place), or with target output data, as occurs in backpropagation training. So, if we take the 'training set' to include target data that can (at times indirectly) become associated with HL patterns (although in backpropagation nets the target data is never actually presented to any layer), then the B&N quotations provided a few paragraphs back must be reconciled the following remark: 'The content of a representational whole is determined by the input constituents together with the weights the representation is subjected to ' (B&N, 2000, p. 136) . These weights would clearly include weights that develop during the association processes just mentioned.
Assuming this last interpretation of 'training set' is correct, it is perhaps infelicitious of B&N to emphasize that in their crucial experiment 'any content found depends on the context' supplied by the training set. It is at least unusual to describe the target output values of backpropagation training as part of the structural context of the training set. Apart from this, however, in the general case, associations that affect weights that impinge on HL activations must include associations formed with other internal activation patterns (found in other hidden layers), and it is distinctly confusing to describe the latter patterns as belonging to the context of the 'training set'. It would appear then, that some refinement of B&N's formulation is needed. These are primarily exegetical concerns, of course. What is important is that B&N do clearly intend that the semantic content of HL patterns is derived, in part, from the 'weights the representation is subjected to'.
The contention that HL activations actually acquire semantic content, in part, from their associations with other data (via the intervening weights) offers promise of providing at least the foundations of an acceptable semantic theory. It should be noted, however, that among philosophers of language, the view that mere correlations between inner states (or symbols) and objects in the outer world provides an adequate explanation for how the inner states refer to (or denote) those outer objects is highly contentious. In any case, associative correlations must be of the right kind if they are to provide the basis for an adequate account of semantic refer-ence (or denotation). Among other things, these associations must be both specialized and elaborate if they are to plausibly constrain the set of situations describable by the external symbol (or sentence) which produced the HL representation in question.
Unfortunately, B&N never address the issue of the appropriateness or complexity of associations that must be formed if their HL representations are to acquire semantic content. They do not, for example, require that this 'associated data' satisfy any standards of 'richness' as one would expect to see when the HL patterns are purported to be representations of the meaning of natural language sentences. Indeed, B&N place no constraints whatsoever on the nature of the data that, during training, becomes associated with HL activation patterns. As a consequence, in the final sections of their paper, B&N no longer employ a conception of semantic content that can be reconciled with the fundamental requirements presented in Section 3. Those requirements are the underpinnings of the traditional conception of semantics employed in my definition of SSS. It is important to recall, moreover, that the latter sense does not create a pro-classicism bias. I have not prejudged the issue whether HL, distributed activation patterns could serve as adequate representations of the semantics of natural language sentences. However, if one is going to claim, as B&N certainly do, that these HL patterns actually possess semantic content by virtue (in part) of their associations with other data, then one must demonstrate that these associations are sufficiently elaborate, and of the appropriate kind. Simply redefining 'semantic content' in order to 'be fair to connectionism' will not suffice. Standards of plausible constraints upon reference and denotation must be preserved if equivocation is to be avoided.
Having said this, I wish to acknowledge that those who take up the challenge of devising network experiments that display SSS are not, of necessity, required to demonstrate that the 'meaning representations' assigned by a trained network to novel test sentences have actually been associated (by training) with plausible states of affairs in the external world. As long as it has been demonstrated that those representations possess structural properties which, given the network's link and weight configuration, permit the sentence to possess appropriate constraints upon its descriptive capacity (i.e. upon the circumstances which the sentence could plausibly describe), then the representations may be correct. The meaning representations employed in Hadley and Hayward (1997) did satisfy this condition. In contrast (as I shall argue in Section 5), B&N fail to show that this condition is satisfied in their case. CLAIM 3. We have now considered two major factors which, on B&N's account, determine an HL activation pattern's semantic content. These are the contextual constraints of the training corpus and the associations which the HL patterns acquire during training. However, B&N make a further claim which, at first glance, suggests that yet another factor determines the semantic content of an HL pattern. They say (2000, p. 119), 'The location of a representation in space determines the content of that representation.' B&N are here speaking of the position in vec-tor space that an HL pattern, construed as a vector, occupies. They remark also that, 'Traditionally, the content of distributed connectionist representations has been defined by applying some operation to groupings of representations, e.g. using nearest-neighbor techniques based on metrics such as Euclidean distance. Appropriate groupings can then be understood as regions in the representational space which define some content of the representations belonging to that group' (p. 117). B&N offer quotes and citations from van Gelder (1991) and Clark (1993) to buttress the propositions I have just quoted. Now, although it appears, initially, that B&N are describing a third source of semantic content for internal representations, their related comments remind us that the position an HL representation occupies in space is determined by a variety of factors, such as the contextual constraints within the training corpus, the learning algorithm used, and the weights that impinge upon the hidden layer. (The latter are affected not only by input and target data, but by the network architecture-a factor B&N do not mention.) At various points, B&N remark that HL representations which cluster together within a given region of space will have similar meanings. They cite van Gelder (1991, p. 371) who states, 'Representations with similar meanings will be found grouped in neighboring points in the space'. However, B&N note that there are exceptions to this generality, and they cite Sharkey and Jackson as having demonstrated 'the danger of relying on simple spatial semantics' (B&N, 2000, p. 135). Interestingly, B&N ignore this caveat entirely when they discuss the results of their various backpropagation experiments.
In any case, I am willing to ignore this complication and to assume, for the sake of argument, that if a set of input sentences actually possesses a coherent, prior semantics, then van Gelder is correct in saying that internal 'representations with similar meanings will be grouped in neighboring points in the space'. Unfortunately for B&N's case, it simply does not follow that because a group of distinct HL activation patterns are clustered together within the same region of space, those patterns possess any semantic content at all. It is well established that clustering of this type can occur merely because a collection of input (training) sentences (which are used to generate the neighboring HL patterns) possess very similar syntactic patterns (see Elman, 1990; Niklasson and van Gelder, 1994 , for examples of such clustering). As noted earlier, it is possible to create a corpus of grammatically correct training sentences using a vocabulary of nonsense tokens. In such a case, HL patterns which cluster together do not reflect similarity of meaning among the input sentences for the simple reason that those sentences have no meaning. Unless, at some point during training, the HL patterns are endowed with meaning by forming a variety of associations of right kind (which could at least constrain genuine referential capacity), there is absolutely no reason to suppose that the HL patterns possess meaning, much less similar meaning.
Admittedly, various of B&N's remarks suggest that they would reject any reliance on an 'archaic' syntactic-semantic distinction which denies that semantics can be derived merely from word-order constraints. However, the attentive reader will have noticed that I am not committed to a rigid syntactic-semantic distinction. I am merely appealing to the basic truths expressed in Section 3. A necessary condition for a (truth-valued) sentence having meaning is that it has descriptive capacity. A necessary condition for the latter is the existence of appropriate associations with experience, or with other representations that (perhaps indirectly) are themselves associated with experience (see Hadley, 1989 , for a discussion of just how indirect such associations can be). One does not need to espouse a simplistic syntactic-semantic distinction in order to embrace these fundamentally necessary conditions.
Apart from the issues hitherto discussed, B&N face another serious difficulty. While interpreting the results of their experiments, B&N take the spatial proximity of 'novel' HL patterns to certain previously generated HL patterns as decisive evidence that the novel patterns possess semantic content similar to those neighboring HL patterns. In so doing, they give every appearance of committing a common fallacy, viz., that of affirming the consequent. Their reasoning appears to be this:
1. If a set of HL representations have similar meanings, their vectors will reside in the same neighborhood of space. 2. This novel representation resides in the same region of space as this known set of HL representations. 3. Therefore, this novel representation possesses a meaning similar to those known HL representations. Essentially this has the form: 'P implies Q', 'Q', therefore 'P'.
It is crucial to realize that the mere spatial proximity of a newly generated HL vector (call it V) to neighboring points that represent coherent and correct semantic representations in no way guarantees that V itself is a coherent semantic representation. Even assuming that V can be decoded, using previously trained RAAM networks, into the original classically symbolic sentence which (perhaps indirectly) generated V, it simply does not follow that V will inherit an appropriate set of associations of the kind required to demonstrate that V's descriptive capacity is properly constrained towards plausible states of affairs in the represented world. For all we know, V may simply be a degraded version of one or more of the neighboring vectors which, presumably, do possess coherent associations of the appropriate kind.
B&N's Systematicity Experiments
In the 'Experiments' section of their paper, B&N describe two types of experiments which they believe to exhibit at least strong systematicity. In what follows, I refer to these as the 'Type 1 -Default-Based Experiments' and the 'Type 2 -Crucial Experiment'. Experiments of both types employ distributed representations generated by RAAM networks. For this reason, it will be helpful to refresh the memories of some readers about the nature of RAAM networks (Recursive, Auto-Associative Memory). "RAAMs (Pollack, 1990) are simple, three layer backpropagation networks whose input and output layers are each divided into regions (N regions, let us say). The network is trained to 'auto-associate', i.e. to reproduce a given pattern of input on the output layer. The purpose of this training is to permit condensed, distributed encodings of those N-tuples (or N-sequences) of information (which are presented to the N regions of the input layer) to be developed on the network's hidden layer. (Figure 1 displays a RAAM network with two regions in each of the input and output layers. So, in this case, N=2.) Once such a distributed encoding has been developed for a given N-tuple of information, that encoding may later be presented as input to a single region of the input layer, while the remaining input regions receive similarly derived distributed encodings. The network may then be trained to auto-associate on this more complex set of input information. By following this general iterative pattern, condensed distributed encodings for entire tree structures (such as binary parse trees) can be generated and extracted from the RAAM's hidden layer." (Note that the above process requires a RAAM's hidden layer to be equal in size to any single region of an input or output layer.) (Hadley, 2002) Let us suppose, now, that a given RAAM has input and output layers that each contain two separate regions of 'bits'. Within the leftmost region, one may present a binary encoding of a given term, say, 'cat'. Within the rightmost region, one may present a binary encoding of a general category that 'cat' belongs to, say, 'noun'. During training of the RAAM, the hidden layer receives information from both the left and right input regions, and over time develops a condensed distributed encoding which blends information from the two input regions. In this way, a distributed encoding for 'cat' can be created which contains information about the category or class of that term. As we shall see, B&N employ this kind of 'class-based encoding' of terms in their systematicity experiments.
TYPE 1: DEFAULT-BASED EXPERIMENTS
B&N acknowledge that their Type 1 experiments do not avoid a criticism which I voiced in my 1994 reply to the claims of Niklasson and van Gelder (1994) . Figure 2 . In this figure, net A is a RAAM whose purpose is to generate distributed class-based encodings for object names. These distributed encodings (produced on the RAAM's hidden layer) blend information about the object name presented in the left input region (e.g., 'tweety') with information about the class name presented in the right-hand region (e.g., 'bird'). The class-based encoding produced on net A's hidden layer is used as input to the left region of net B's input layer. Net B's right-hand input region is fed information about an object's activity, e.g., 'flies'. Net B is considered an assertion encoder because it develops distributed encodings for assertions such as 'tweety-bird flies'. Such distributed encodings of assertions are fed as input to net C, the transformation network. Net C is trained to associate an assertion with a variant of itself. For example, if the input to net C is 'Bird fly' (written as R(Bird Fly) by B&N), then net C is trained to output an encoding of 'Bird Can Fly' (written by B&N as R(R(Bird Fly) Can))).
(See Hadley, 1994b , for full details.) As noted earlier, my 1994 critique described several problems with Niklasson's approach to encoding and training, but the criticism that B&N currently acknowledge concerns the RAAM-generated distributed encoding assigned to the single (putatively) novel term that Niklasson employed. I had, in 1994, complained that Niklasson had biased his network's results by, in essence, assigning to the solitary 'novel' term (call it NT) a distributed encoding which shared many featural values with all non-novel terms appearing within precisely the same syntactic position as NT occupied in the test sentences. (Phillips, 1994 , independently voiced this same objection.) This 'biasing' of NT's featural encoding involved, among other things, having first assigned to NT a specially-tailored bit encoding, which was later combined with a 'syntactic category encoding', when a RAAM network was employed to assign NT a distributed encoding.
As noted, B&N recognize that their Type 1 experiments are open to the objection just explained. However, in my view, the current (Type 1 -default-based) experiments are open to a more severe version of this criticism, for the following reason. The current experiments involve default reasoning with terms, such as 'sparrow', 'penguin', 'tweety' and 'ernie' which are assigned to classes, such as 'bird'. All such terms are assigned distributed encodings by a RAAM network, whose encoding processes are influenced by error feedback from another taskoriented (transformation) network. (See Figure 2 for further details of the networks involved.) RAAM generated encodings for terms such as 'tweety' and 'sparrow' are created in RAAM A, shown in Figure 2 . These encodings are produced on the RAAM's hidden layer and include information about the 'class' that these terms pertain to, e.g., 'bird'. During the encoding process, B&N have ensured that distributed encodings of the two 'novel' terms they employ not only share a substantial amount (about 50%) of class-based featural information with non-novel terms occurring in the identical syntactic position, but these distributed encodings are partially shaped by error feedback derived from every task that the 'novel' terms are ever involved in. In particular, error feedback that occurs in training the transformation network (net C in Figure 2 ) is used to refine the weights of the two RAAM networks (A and B) in Figure 2 . The only task performed in the type I experiments is assigned to the transformation net, C.
(B&N repeatedly describe the influence of this error feedback, though they find no fault with it.) In the 1994 work of Niklasson and van Gelder, the RAAM generated encoding of the novel term was not influenced by error feedback from the later transformation task, and so was arguably less biased in favor of success than the 'novel' terms that B&N employ in Type 1 experiments.
Because the latter experiments not only involve the result-biasing technique of pre-assigning class-based representations to putatively novel terms, but involve the task-oriented biasing just described, I submit that B&N have failed to make a credible case for strong systematicity in their Type 1 experiments.
TYPE 2: THE CRUCIAL EXPERIMENT
As noted earlier, B&N are aware that the experiments discussed above do not meet the published reservations of Hadley (1994b) or of Phillips (1994) . However, they present one final experiment which they believe adequately answers those reservations. While B&N stress that this crucial experiment does not satisfy the precise requirements of SSS (as I define it), they do insist that it satisfies a kind of strong semantic systematicity. Also, as previously remarked, they contend that the only reason this experiment does not satisfy my SSS, is that they have redefined a number of terms of 'folk psychology', and in doing so have adopted a conception of 'semantic content' which they believe now provides connectionists with a level playing field.
I have earlier offered reasons why I think B&N's conception of semantics suffers from several serious difficulties. In what follows, we shall see how these difficulties arise in their crucial experiment. Quite apart from concerns about 'semantics', however, their interpretation of this experiment involves a fatal equivocation involving the expression, 'novel test sentence'. To see this, we must review the general outline of their experimental design.
As in the Type 1 (Default-Based experiments), the Type 2 (Crucial) experiment employs two RAAM networks and a simple, two layer, transformation network.
(These networks are just as displayed in Figure 2 , except that net C's output layer now contains only a single unit.) The first RAAM net is used to create class-based distributed representations for the atomic terms. (E.g., the term 'ernie' is given the class-based encoding, 'bird'.) A total of three terms ('ernie', 'bo', and 'jack') ever receive class-based encodings during the entire course of the experiment. During the first of two training phases, class-based encodings are created for 'ernie' and 'bo' on the first RAAM's hidden layer and are extracted for later use in the second RAAM. The third of the atomic names, ('jack') does not receive a class encoding until a second training phase is performed.
The second RAAM (net B, the assertion encoder) is used to create encodings for four very simple 'sentences', namely, R(ernie fly) [which we may read as 'ernie flies'], R(ernie not-fly), R(bo fly), R(bo not-fly)
It is relevant to note that, although 'bo' has the class-based encoding of 'fish', the assertion encoder RAAM is never trained to generate assertions to the effect that Bo swims or that Ernie (which is a bird) does not swim.
RAAM generated encodings for two of the four assertions shown above are used in the initial training of the last of the three networks, the transformation network. In particular, the transformation network is initially trained to output '1' (or 'true') when the input is R(ernie fly) and to output '0' (or 'false') when the input is R(bo fly). During a later training phase, this same network is trained to output '1' for the assertion R(jack fly). Now, because 'jack' does not receive a class-based encoding during the initial training phase of the first RAAM, B&N regard it as a novel token. Moreover, the distributed encoding assigned to R(jack fly) was created by simply presenting 'jack' and 'fly' to the two input regions of the second RAAM and extracting the contents of that RAAM's hidden layer. This RAAM received no training on that input during the initial training phase.
Once this second RAAM (B) has created a distributed encoding for R(jack fly), B&N present this encoding as input to the third network (transformation net). At this stage, the transformation network produces no useful response to R(jack fly). Since no class encoding has been assigned to 'jack', this is perfectly understandable. A human would likewise be unable to produce any helpful response to R(jack fly) at this stage, since the human would have no idea whether 'jack' is supposed to be a bird, a fish, or even mud. For this very reason, R(jack fly) is not a reasonable 'novel test sentence' for the network.
However, B&N next proceed to train (C) the transformation network, for 1000 epochs, on the assertion encoding for R(jack fly). Backpropagation is employed, and the target output during this second training phase is '1'. During this new training phase, error feedback not only alters the behaviour of the transformation network on R(jack fly), but is conveyed back to the hidden layer of the second RAAM, and thence back to the hidden layer of the first RAAM. The input-tohidden-layer links of both these RAAMs are trained, during the 1000 epochs just mentioned, using this error feedback.
As we would expect, this second training phase eventually succeeds in associating R(jack fly), within the transformation network, with an output value of '1'. That network is now able to produce '1' for just two input sentences. Under these circumstances, and given that error feedback is used during this second training phase to shape the input-to-hidden-layer weights of the initial class-based RAAM encoder, it is not surprising that the hidden layer encoding eventually assigned to 'jack' lies very close, in vector space, to the hidden layer encoding of 'ernie'. After all, the only other assertion ever trained to produce an output of '1' is R(ernie fly).
What is surprising (to my mind), is that B&N believe that the results just described entail that this last experiment displays an important kind of strong semantic systematicity. Indeed, the results just cited are their sole justification for the following claim: 'The connectionist system we present in the following will be able to assign relevant semantic content to novel tokens appearing in test sentences which could demonstrate strong systematicity.' (Bodén and Niklasson, 2000, p. 113) . The textual context and precise wording of this quote make it clear that B&N have my SS in mind when they say 'strong systematicity'. Moreover, their discussion of this last experiment makes it entirely clear that they regard the sentence R(jack fly) as the critical test sentence, and they regard 'jack' as the novel term that is assigned 'relevant semantic content'. (For brevity, I shall refer to 'R(jack fly)' as sentence 'S'). Now, as the reader will recall, not only my definitions of SSS, and SS, but even the definition of 'weak systematicity' requires that a trained network be tested upon a 'novel test sentence'. Moreover, in their original characterization of systematicity, F&P are clearly claiming that humans who have the capacity to understand a sentence such as 'Mary sees the kitten' will automatically have the capacity to understand systematically related sentences that they have never encountered before. The employment of novel test sentences is therefore an essential component of any counterexample to F&P. Yet, at the (post-training) stage where B&N are able to claim some form of success for their network, it would be bizarre to regard S as a novel test sentence. For, at this final stage, their network has been subjected to intensive training upon S (1000 epochs). Now, it is beyond dispute that as 'novel token' and 'novel test data' are commonly used by connectionists, 'jack' and S are, at the relevant stage, not novel test data. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that B&N are unaware of the common usage of those phrases. Any charitable reading of B&N must, therefore, assume that B&N are using those phrases in some new and surprising sense. Given this, I can only conclude that B&N have committed a serious instance of the fallacy of equivocation.
In any case, B&N imply, more than once, that this crucial experiment deals satisfactorily with my criticism (Hadley, 1994b) concerning the pre-assignment of class-based encodings employed in Niklasson's and van Gelder's 1994 experiments. Yet, that criticism was set in the context of my definitions of weak and strong systematicity, which both assumed the normal understanding of novel test data. Any experiment directed at meeting those qualms must employ this same understanding if equivocation and fallacy are to be avoided. The same holds true of my SSS challenge and of F&P's original (1988) challenge. What then are we to make of B&N's summary remark that '... we contend that the connectionist metaphor is not only leveling with Fodor and Pylyshyn's (1988) challenge but with Hadley's (1994a, b) revised challenge of semantic systematicity'? B&N's crucial experiment does not even satisfy the novelty requirements of my 'weak systematicity'. Admittedly, B&N have taken care to state that they 'do not achieve exactly what semantic systematicity requires'. However, the quotations given above and in the introduction demonstrate that B&N have at various points claimed, implied, and suggested that they have dealt with not only my challenges, but that of F&P.
Apart from the foregoing issue of novelty, there remains B&N's clear claim that their network 'will be able to assign relevant semantic content to novel tokens appearing in test sentences which could demonstrate strong systematicity'. We have seen that B&N take 'jack' to be the novel token, but what of their contention that 'jack' has, in the end, been assigned 'relevant semantic content'? B&N's belief is that, upon completion of both training phases, both 'jack' and 'ernie' have been assigned virtually identical semantic content -the content being the class 'bird'. The case they offer for this belief is that, following all training, the HL vectors for 'ernie' and 'jack' occupy nearly the same region of vector space. B&N describe this spatial region as the 'bird' region, though their justification for this ascription is dubious. The ascription cannot rely on the supposition that both 'ernie' and 'jack' have 'bird' content, because their spatial proximity is being cited as a reason for claiming that 'jack' has 'bird' content. Moreover, at the crucial time of testing, it is most unlikely that 'ernie' is any longer associated with a correct encoding of 'bird' (as we shall soon see). In any case, as explained in Section 4, the mere fact that the HL vector of a (purportedly) novel term or sentence lies close in vector space to another vector in no way establishes that the 'novel HL vector' represents a correct or coherent meaning, as opposed to a garbled and degraded version of the remaining vector. Moreover, we have seen that the mere fact that such vectors occupy positions in vector space does not ensure that these vectors represent any meaning. We are only entitled to assume that the vectors represent meanings when they possess appropriate, and sufficiently elaborate associations within the cognitive agent. Let us consider therefore the associations developed for the HL vector of 'jack' within B&N's networks.
B&N observe that the internal representation of 'jack' is strongly influenced by the associations formed for the distributed encoding of 'jack flies' (i.e. sentence S) during the final training of net C. Arguably then, net C should be considered an important source of semantic associations for 'jack', given that sentence S contains 'jack'. Now, within net C, S's encoding becomes associated with an output value of '1'. R(ernie fly) also has exactly this same association. Should we assume, therefore that both these sentences mean or describe '1'? Also, if other sentences, including R(bo swims), had been trained to produce '1' in the output layer of the transformation network, would they also mean or describe '1'? It is clear that the unstructured output value, '1', is far too simple to endow an appropriate, referentially constrained semantics on 'ernie flies', 'jack flies', 'bo swims', and every other sentence that could reasonably be associated with an output value of '1' (or 'true'). Moreover, the mere fact -that the distributed encodings of these sentences are all capable of generating '1' as output -reflects a task that is too trivial to demonstrate that each of these encodings already possesses structural properties that, within the context of the network's weight configuration, would permit correct and coherent associations with suitably constrained content to be acquired.
It follows, then, that if either S or 'jack' possesses sufficient associations to justify the claim that 'jack' has the semantic content 'bird', we must look beyond the transformation net (C). The obvious alternative to net C is net A, where 'jack' becomes obliquely associated with the contents of A's right hand input region (where 'bird' was originally presented). (The association is merely oblique because both input regions of net A feed into its hidden layer, which in turn modifies the links emanating from both those regions.) Furthermore, it could be argued (although B&N have not done so) that sentence S possesses appropriate associations, albeit indirectly, with the right hand region of net A. After all, the distributed encoding of S has been extracted from the hidden layer of net B, which receives half its input from a representation derived from the hidden layer of net A, which, in turn, receives half its input from the region where the 'class name' for 'birds' was presented.
The supposition just outlined does not accord readily with B&N's description of the values supplied to both input regions of net A as 'word tokens'. For, if the input supplied to the right hand input region of net A is merely a word token for 'bird', and not an encoding of the concept 'bird', then we have no reason to suppose that 'jack' or S ever become associated with semantic content. (We have seen that semantic content cannot be created merely from the statistics of word sequences.) However, there appears to be no intrinsic reason not to suppose that A's right hand region receives an encoding of the concept for 'bird', and it may benefit B&N's case to adopt this assumption. Let us do so, therefore.
Unfortunately, B&N now face a much more serious snag. For, as they clearly explain (pp. 133-134), they forced the encoding of 'bird' to mutate substantially during the second training phase (i.e., the phase when the supposedly 'novel' sentence (S) received intensive training). Recall that S was subjected to 1000 epochs of training. During each such epoch, the input-to-HL weights of both net B and net A were altered. At the end of a single epoch, the new weights in net A were used to generate a modified encoding for 'bird', as follows. A feed-forward pass through net A was performed, and the output produced in the top right-hand region of net A was used as the 'current' input representation for 'bird' throughout the next epoch. Since the relevant weights of net A were altered during each of the 1000 epochs, we have excellent reason to suppose that the 'final' representation used as the encoding of 'bird' had altered considerably by the time the crucial testing occurred. B&N note that this strategy contributed to 'jack' having eventually attained an HL encoding that lies close in vector space to the HL encoding of 'ernie'. Thus, their case apparently requires that the original encoding of the crucial (semantic) content for 'bird' undergo substantial mutation during the training of all three networks involved. Now, given that the initial, presumably correct semantic encoding for 'bird' was forced to mutate 1000 times during a crucial training period, there appears to be no reason whatsoever to suppose that the eventual encoding of 'bird' (with which 'jack' is arguably associated) is a correct encoding for 'bird'. (Note that if we do not assume that the initial encoding of 'bird' was correct, then there is certainly no reason to suppose that the eventual encoding is correct -there has been no other source for relevant semantic associations to arise.) Thus, we seemingly have absolutely no reason to suppose that 'jack' is ever assigned 'relevant semantic content' (to use B&N's words). B&N have simply failed to ensure that any plausible standards of correctness have been applied to the semantic content in question. It is interesting to note, moreover, that the same alteration of weights, which has undermined the credibility of 'bird's encoding, has likewise undermined 'ernie's original association with the initial encoding of 'bird'. Thus, any hope that the HL encoding of 'jack' might inherit correct semantic associations because of its spatial proximity to that of 'ernie' is ill-founded; 'ernie's semantic associations have lost their credentials. (Recall that we have also seen that the mere position of 'jack's HL encoding in vector space does not ensure that 'jack' possesses any correct or coherent semantic content.) However, perhaps it will be objected that many of our concepts do change over time, as additional associations are formed with other objects. If concepts can change, why should we not allow the 'bird' concept to mutate in this experiment?
To reply: it is true that concepts can evolve over time, and still be considered correct in their later stages. However, in such cases, there are good reasons for considering the later, evolved concept to be legitimate. For example, a child may, over time, encounter a wider variety of dogs than initially encountered; the child's 'dog' concept evolves accordingly. In this case, and other relevant cases, new associations are formed with experienced objects, or with internal representations, capable of contributing legitimate semantic content. However, in B&N's case, the word 'jack', by hypothesis, possesses no prior semantic content. In a case such as this, our 'object' concept does not mutate merely because we come to associate an entirely fresh word with the pre-existing concept. Rather, this is what constitutes 'learning a synonym'. A child's concept of a tadpole does not alter merely because the child later learns that 'pollywog' means the same as 'tadpole'.
We have now considered two separate types of associations, which, at first glance, might appear to provide 'relevant semantic content' for the word 'jack'. These are: (a) associations (in net C) between entire assertion encodings and a binary value (1 or 0); (b) an association (in net A) between the token 'jack' and a substantially mutated encoding of 'bird'. The former, (a), was seen to provide only weak constraints on semantic content and the latter, (b), has been shown to be invalid. Given the invalidity of (b), there is no reason to think that the combination of (a) and (b) could provide a better source of semantic content for 'jack' than (a) alone. Moreover, there are no other associations for 'jack' which, even at first blush, provide credible grounds for saying that 'jack' has acquired the correct class content for 'bird'.
It might, however, be suggested that B&N could perform new experiments in which the encoding of 'bird' is held fixed during both training phases. Conceivably, this new experiment would produce results comparable to the results reported by B&N in their paper. However, counter to this suggestion, one wonders why, if B&N could obtain comparable results while holding the encoding of 'bird' fixed at all times, they have contrived to force, in an ad hoc fashion, the encoding of 'bird' to mutate. In any case, it would be pointless for B&N to perform this suggested experiment. For, as we know, there remains the insuperable difficulty that (S) 'jack flies' is not a novel sentence during the crucial test phase.
Apart from the foregoing difficulties, B&N's claim to have demonstrated that the 'connectionist metaphor is leveling with' my SSS challenge seems implausible for the following reasons:
• They employ a solitary novel term, having no prior meaning, in a single position, rather than testing known terms, having known meanings, in novel positions.
• They effectively ignore the SSS requirement that appropriate generalization be proven for a 'significant fraction' of the vocabulary. Admittedly, of the three nouns employed in their crucial experiment, exactly one ('jack') is taken by B&N to be novel, so one-third of their nouns were intended to be novel. However, it is only because B&N employ such a minuscule vocabulary that the figure of one-third arises. (Indeed, B&N have employed a 'toy' domain beyond compare.) My 1994 objections to Niklasson and van Gelder's experiments included concerns about their having employed just a single novel term. Yet, the same strategy has been adopted here.
• The SSS condition, that generalization be proven within embedded clauses as well as in simple sentences, is ignored. Yet, this condition is important. Phillips (1994) was able to demonstrate positional generalization within very simple sentences, but to my knowledge, he has not succeeded with clausally complex sentences.
Summary and Conclusions
In the foregoing, we have examined several of B&N's specific claims regarding both strong systematicity and semantic systematicity. We have seen that, although B&N acknowledge that their crucial experiment has not achieved 'exactly what [Hadley's SSS] requires', the implication of their remark is that they came as close to SSS as scientific reality requires. For, they add, 'Instead, we have shown that by redefining some central concepts in folk psychology ... a similar kind of contextbased systematicity can be achieved' (B&N, 2000, p. 138) . I have argued that, in reality, B&N have fallen far short of satisfying the requirements of SSS. The solitary fact that B&N did not employ any genuinely novel test sentence entails that not even weak systematicity was demonstrated. For this reason alone, it is unreasonable for B&N to claim that 'a similar kind of context-based systematicity' has been achieved. This same, solitary fact renders B&N's contention -that they have now successfully dealt with my published 1994 qualms -absurd. One could only quell those misgivings by exhibiting a straightforward case of strong systematicity, and that entails using a genuinely novel test sentence. Likewise, one could only satisfy F&P's 1988 challenge by demonstrating success with novel test sentences. B&N purport to be 'leveling with' these challenges, yet they have equivocated both with 'novel test sentence' and with 'semantic content'.
We have seen that B&N have unwittingly employed the concept of 'semantics' in two importantly different ways. Their initial characterization of 'semantics' accorded with the traditional view that the semantics of a word or sentence strongly constrains its possible referents in the represented world. Their later, but crucial characterization, laid great stress on the context-sensitive nature of HL activation patterns, but placed no restrictions on the appropriateness of associations formed by those HL patterns. Whether, in a given case, an HL pattern may be viewed as a coherent and correct semantic representation depends greatly on that pattern's internal structure and its capacity for forming and inheriting appropriately elaborate and highly relevant associations. Because B&N do not address this latter capacity, they have, in effect, adopted unacceptably weak standards for 'semantic content'. The discrepancy between these weak standards and the traditional conception of semantics amounts to an equivocation on 'semantic content'. This equivocation is serious for two reasons. First, B&N have themselves endorsed, within their introduction, a traditional, reference-based view of semantics. Secondly, B&N contend that their results demonstrate that the 'connectionist metaphor' is 'leveling with' the challenges posed by F&P and by myself. However, one cannot level with (or come to terms with) those challenges while adopting a concept of 'semantic content' which no longer requires that words in sentences are suitably constrained in their descriptive (referential) capacity.
Amidst these criticisms, it is worth remembering that B&N are not alone in their virtual neglect of the referential (or descriptive) aspects of semantics. For example, Landauer and Dumais (1997) offer two alternative interpretations of their research on latent semantic content, but suggest that the more radical interpretation could well be the correct one. According to this radical interpretation, not only our knowledge of sentence meanings, but all human knowledge would be the result of statistical correlations involving only co-occurences of words and word phrases. Their argument entirely ignores forms of knowledge which arise from lengthy deductive proofs, such as those found in mathematics and philosophy. It also ignores the necessity of 'semantic-grounding' associations between symbols and the world of experience. Other researchers in latent semantic analysis (LSA) have claimed that statistical co-occurrence relations between mere words can, in and of itself, create semantic content (see Wiemer-Hastings and Zipitria, 2001) .
Apart from LSA, an exaggerated emphasis on the context sensitivity of sentence meanings is common (though happily not universal) in connectionist treatments of semantic issues. Indeed, B&N cite a plethora of connectionist publications in support of their stance on context sensitive representations. While it is widely agreed, even among classicists, that context sensitivity can, at times, enter into the composition of sentence meanings, connectionist research in this area must respect the most obvious facts about words and their (warranted) referents. It is a brute fact that 'rabbits' refers to the same set of objects in 'Rabbits are faster than turtles' and 'Ferraris are faster than rabbits'.
The preservation of appropriate referential constraints of this kind is a litmus test for any connectionist model purported to generate semantically adequate, HL representations. There do exist connectionist models which can both pass this litmus test and develop strongly distributed HL representations (e.g. St. John and McClelland, 1990 ). However, I have discovered no such model which also satisfies the requirements of SSS. Yet, as demonstrated in F&P (1988) and Hadley (1994b) , the human brain commonly preserves both referential constancy and SSS. 2 If, for example, 'cats' had only appeared during training just prior to a verb, and all training sentences had the form Noun Verb Noun, then a novel test sentence such as 'cats see cats' would not be successfully processed by a weakly systematic network. However, 'cats see mice' would be correctly processed, provided 'mice' had appeared just after some verb, during training. 3 Note that if 'food' had appeared, during training, only within embedded sentences and immediately following a verb, then the simple sentence, 'mice seek food', would not qualify as a novel test sentence for present purposes. Also, given our background concern with cognitive plausibility, training corpora which are used to induce strong systematicity must not present the entire training vocabulary in all the legal syntactic positions, but should refrain from doing so for a significant fraction of that vocabulary' (Hadley, 1994a, pp. 250-251) . 4 This conclusion applies with equal force to the more radical interpretations advanced by various researchers in the area of latent semantic analysis. This point is elaborated in the final discussion (Section 6). 5 It is, in fact, widely recognized that mere associative correlation does not suffice to explain denotation. Otherwise kidneys would denote livers and vice versa.
